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The publication or the so-callea
majority and minority reports did not
reveal the full intricacy of the
discussions. It was not, as Fr. Murphy
suggests, merely a question of holding
the traditional line no matter what the
cost. This is clear from the minority
report ·which, although 'I presided at
many meetings of the ·Pontifical
Commission, I had not seen before it
appeared in The Tablet~ It was not
signed by any of the cardinals or
bishops. I assume that the priests who
signed sent their views privately to the
Pope. This does not constitute what in
.England we would call an official
minority report.

similarly under .irivestigation. T ~re are
doctors who fear that del ~e rious
effects niay reve~ themselves Jy in a
future generation. They refer f ,)Omily
to the lesson provided y the
thalidomide babies. All this l 'S to be
weighed by the Pope before .e gives
the Church his guidance. It ". ·.mld be
irresponsible to attempt to rce ·the
Vicar of Christ to
ake a
pronouncement before he is r !dy.
1

Nobody knows what the ,. ~)fld will
be like in ten years' time . l >. Jer God
it depends largely on the gre:· · powers.
Before the end of this dec · :e China
will . almost certainly have -.,_;veloped
every kind of nuclear device 'Ne know
from scientists that if testinr · ntinues
on -a large scale the effe, : will be
DOCTORS DISAGREE
unpredictable. Thirty yea: . ago the
experts warned us of tl · risk of
The problem facing the Pope
depopulation. We now kno" that they
concerns not only contraception itself
were wrong. The experts )day give
but the morality of certain methods.
warning of intolerable ove1-;. opulation
This does .not mean that the Pope
by the end of the centur·. They, in
must adjudicate on the various
turn, may be made wrong .~y genetic
contraceptive appliances, chemicals or
changes in mankind. Wha, the Pope
pills. This is obviously not the task of
says will, of co u ! .e , have
the Church. Herein, I imagine, the
comparatively small effe,· on tot~
chief difficulty lies. Everyone knows
world population. The 1 ,·-1jority ll1
that some contraceptives are
Ash'I, Africa and South AI" ~- .dca is not
abortifacients while others · induce
likely to be guided by papal
temporary sterility. It follows that the
morality of sterilisation and abortion . pro noun.c ements. T h t; Se most
anxiously awaiting guidm,ce are the
might need to be reconsidered.
devoted Catholics living mainly in the
Medical science is , not yet ready to
pronounce on the likely effects of . West who are troubled j~ss by the
threat of over-population :.han by the
contraceptive pills. Many doctors
physical and psychological hazards ~f
regard them as reasonably safe. A
married life in moderri conditions. It 15
strong minority will have nothing to
these people and their d ergy ~ho
do with them in the present state of
desp'e rately · await tlL' pronused
medical knowledge. They will not
statement.
Today in the same to~ ,
permit their wives to take the risk of
and even in the same pansh, priests lfl
using them. It may not yet be possible
the confessional offer conflicting
to prove a causal connection between
advice. I believe this t o be the chief
smoking and lung cancer. A causal
reason
for the present state of the
connection between the use of certain
magisterium.
contraceptive pills and thrombosis is
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Recent advances in transplant
aurgery have created a need for a
re-evaluation of the moral principles
Ythich might be applied in the
1~'-·0IIoluttio,n of certain of the problems
equent upon such medical
..".~""~~. The present article makes no
:Jre1tense at giving to the medical or
worlds definitive answers which
make their respective tasks a
matter of "application of
IIIUIICll>Je." One might criticize the
as being but a repetition of what
already been said by eminent
and moralists. Such a
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Philosophy at Gwynedd-Mercy
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-~,to1tm University and attained
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Modern Schoolman,
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Wt11 awanled the Lindback A ward
distinguished teaching at Villanova
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of the St. Augustine Lecture
published by the Augustinian
at Villanova, and Associate
of a new journal, Augustinian
to be published in 1969.
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criticism would indeed be justified; for
it is the ·purpose of the author to
present a collation of thoughts and
principles, mainly from the Christian
point of view, which woUld be
applicable to the possible resolution of
the moral problems of organ
transplantation, and at the same time
open the many doors of the "house of
dialogue" which follow from such a
presentation.
MEANS OF PRESERVING LIFE

Since man is obliged to use all
reasonable and moral means of
preserving his bodily health and well
being, let us for the moment briefly
consider the moralist's distinction of
ordinary and extraordinary means of
preserving one's life and bodily
integrity. Fr. Murray is brief but
concise in this matter in saying:

Ordinary means might best be
defined as those that are at hand,
and do not entail effort, suffer1ng,
or expense beyond that which
prudent men would consider proper
for a serious undertaking according
to the state of life of each
individual person. Extraordinary
means, on the other hand, are
means that are not commonly used
by prudent persons, and that
in~olve
se-rious difficulty or
inconvenience. 1

249

•..

t•

.·.

l• f

'

I

,

1

Fr. Kelly tells us that the theologian
would say that:

... ordinary means of preserving
life are all medicines, treatments,
and operations, which offer a
reasonable hope of benefit for the
patient and which can be obtained.
and used· without ·excessive
expense, pain, or other
inconvenience . . . In
contradistinction to ordinary are
extraordinary means of preserving
life. By these . we mean all
medicines, treatments, and
operations, which cannot be
obtained or used without excessive
expense, pain or other
inconvenience, or which, if used,
would not ·-offer a reasonable hope
of benefit. 2
From another point of view:
Ordinary means may be natural, as
sufficient nourishment, protection
against heat and cold, rest, hygiene,
ordinary rem_e dies, ordinary
nursing; and artificial, as certain
ordinary techniques, intravenous
serum, oxygen, blood transfus~ons,
insulin, incubators and minor
operations. . .. It is not easy to
give an exact definition of
extraordinary means of preserving
life. However they can be
recognized from the following
general characteristics: little chance
of success, high cost, and
objectionable aspects. 3
Not only is it difficult to determine
in the practical order of things what is
ordinazy and extraordinary in some
cases, but the difficulty is
compounded by the different uses to
which the physician puts these terms. 4
However, there are some means which
most moralists consider as
extraordinary for all men, "such as
rare and expensive operations or
extensive traveling for one's health;
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whereas the same ethici~ms .c ;nsider
most of the commonly 2'- ailable
techniques of modern surgt· f and
medicine as ordinary meam ' 5 St.
Alphonsus tells us that no ~1an is
obliged to use an extraordinar . means
of preserving health of life , · 'Jt that
we are allowed to empk r such
means. 6 In certain cases one 1 <ty have
a duty to use extraordinar means
when his failure to do so wo~ ·d result
in a failure to fulfill other du : ,; s, such
as in the case of the head of : nation
upon whom rests the sec;·. 'ty and
well-being of those under I- charge.
At this point let us ·simply .~ate that
one is always obliged to u& Jrdinary
means of sustaining bodily --ztegrity;
whe-reas, one may use ex t•·. 1rdinary
means if he so desires or if ('t "' h means
is necessary for the fulfillme:·. of some
other grave obligation.
·
MUTILATION AND CO.''SENT
St. · Thomas Aquinas
mutilation as follows:

·.) eaks of

of the
is for the
sake of the whole, as t h;- imperfect
for the perfect. Hence, a ,nember of
the human body is to h~ disposed
of according as it is expedient for
the body. Now a member of the
human body is of itse tf useful to
the good of the whole body, yet,
accidentally it may happen to be
hurtful, as when a decayed member
is a source of corruption to the
whole body-.... If, however, the
member be decayed an d therefore,
a source of corruption to the whole
body then it is lawful with the
cons~nt of the owner of the
member to cut away the member
for the ~elfare of the whole body,
since each one is ent rusted with the
care of his own welfare. 7
Since

a member is

whol~- human body ,

IY1, t

it
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.. what Aquinas tells us we can
that -when mutilation becomes
"for the· welfare of the
body," as in medically indicated
surgery, the consent of the
must be 9btained. In this
article 6 of the Moral Code
by the Canadian Hierarchy in
, 1954, states:
the procedures listed in this
as permissible require the
nsent, at least reasonably
of the patient or his
This condition is to be
llll<lers1tood in e.ach .case.

consents to _ a medical or
procedure, it is necessary that
t be of his own free choice.
Nuremberg Code represents ten
to which physicians should
when engaged in experiments
ns. The PTinciples grew out of
.JU(lgntent laid down at Nuremberg,
during the war crimes
in August of 1947. The
defendents, mostly
were accused of crimes
involved experimentation upon
subject's. The world is still
at the merciless and inhumane
in which these experiments
conducted. The code clearly
out that the first consideration
experimentation is the
consent of the subjects:
voluntary consent of the
an subject is absolutely
This means that the
involved should have legal
to give c.onsent; should be
lltllate·:d as to be able to exercise
power of choice, without the
tion of any element of
; fraud, deceit, duress,
pnc~acl1in2. or other ulterior form
constratintorcoercion; and should
sufficient knowledge and
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comprehension of the elements of
the subject matter involved as to
enable him to make an
understanding and enlightened
deciswn. 8
However it should be kept in mind
that in ' certain instances one may not
be able to , give his personal consent.
This may occur in such cases as when:
1. One is not sui compos and his ·
parents or guardians have the moral or
legal right to act in his behalf.
2. An attending physician in a case
of emergency - dis~ster, accident,
etc., must anticipate consent of
person.
Nonetheless, it is essential that any
medical or surgical treatment "require
the consent, at least reasonably
presumed, of the patient or his
guardians," since "each one is
entrusted with the care of his own
welfare." It would seem then that the
moral justification of mutilation
would rest essentially upon free and
deliberate consent of the individual as
well as the proportionate necessity of
saciificing a part of the body in an
attempt to preserve the integrity of
the whole. We will see later that the
mutilation of one's body under certain
conditions may be employed to save
another.
PRINCIPLE OF TOTALITY
Earlier we spoke of the
proportionate necessity of sacrificing 'a
part of the body in an attempt to
preserve the integrity of the whole. In
order to comprehend such necessity
we can here ask: What is man's
relation to himself and to his body? In
brief, let us simply state that God has
direct dominion over life and over the
human body, for God is . man's
efficient cause and last end. In that life
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is given to man, he has a consequent
obligation to attain to all reasonable
and moral means of sustaining that life
and of avoiding needless danger to
health, limb and body. As custodian of
his life and bodily integrity man is
obliged to tend to his physical and
mental well-being. Mutillation is
accomplished by means of an
accidental or intended destruction of
an organic function or removal of a
bodily part which is necessary for
bodily integrity. According to St.
Thomas and most · moralists, it is
morally permissibie when a bodily part
threatens the integrity of the whole
"to cut away the member _for the
welfare ofrthe whole body ;" 9 for , "it
is morally permissible to sacrific~ a
part for the good of the whole, when
the welfare of the whole body cannot
be secured by any other means." 1 0 It
should be clear that mutilation cannot
be permitted except for a
proportionately grave reason. That we
may engage in a physical evil such as
mutilation is ably expressed by Fr.
Gerald Kelly as follows:
.. . there are some physical evils
that are naturally subordinated to
higher ends, and we have a right ~o
cause these evils in order to obtam
these ends. Thus, the bodily
member is. subordinated to the
good of the whole bodY_, and one
has a right to remove this member
when this is necessary for the good
of the whole ... the principle, evil
is not to be done is not an
absolutely universal principle. It
refers absolutely to moral evil. As
for physical evil it refers to those
which lie outside the scope of the
agent's direct rights (e.g., death of
an innocent person); it does not
refer to evils that one has a right to
cause (e.g. , self-mutilation to
preserve life or health; the deat~ of
an enemy soldier or an unJUSt
1
aggre~sor ). 1
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Suffice it here to say t ha · we may
morally mutilate an organ c 11ember
for the adequate good of ·:: whole
body when there is a pro• rtionate
reason for the same. SucL ·t moral
justification is founded on ~ at Pope
Pius XII termed the "Pn .~i ple of
Totality." 12 In one of his .Jmerous
addresses on medical an d ·.cientific
subjects, the Pontif stated '1at man
did not have "unlimited ·)wer to
destroy or mutilate his be · and its
functions."
1

Nevertheless, by virt11 of the
principle of totality, bv ··irtue of
his right to use the sep.- es of his
organism as a whole, ' :-; patient
can allow individual r rs to be
destroyed or mutilated ,, · .m and to
the extent necessary fc the good
of his being as a whole. 1 ·
And this could be done \' 1
necessary to "ensure 1
existence and to avoid, o;
to repair serious and last
which cannot otherwise bl~
repaired." 1 4

.~n

it was
:
being's
naturally,
g damage
,voided or

The Pope is cautiG ·s in his
presentation of the pr;o;.;iple and
repeats himself thus:
This principle asserts i : .1t the part
exist for the whole and that,
consequently, the good Jf the pa~
remains subordinated t u the g?0
of the whole , that thv whole lS a
determining factor for :. he .Part and
can disfose of it 1:1 1ts _own
interest. 5 .
"Thus, it is in ihe propel
application of this pri.ricil-1 le that we
have the moral justification for
surgical operati o n s such as
appendectomy, ch o lecystect·o~~~
thyroidectomy, lobotomy , et~. , b
destruction of organs and functwns. ~
irradiation; medical treatments wit
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untoward by-products, e.g. ,
antibotics; etc." 16 From the
of such medical and surgical
bc:edures we can see that the
evil effected is outweighed by
physical good effected. And as
Connell states it: "according to
holic moral principles, the
•t~atiion or excision of a .part of the
is permitted only when there is
ty or probability that benefit
thereby come to the whole body
sufficient measure to compensate
the harm that has been done." 1 7
essential point in all these things
in terms of the total welfare of
patient, there is a just proportion
the harm, inconvenience, and
on the one hand, and, on the
r hand, the good to be
IDco.mplisllLed for the patient." 1 8 The
of every medical or surgical
must be evaluated in the
of its purpose and necessity. "In
ral, we may observe that
of one's own body without
reason, is an offense against
perance or fortitude; while
mutilation of the body
UD[)th~er is an act of injustice." 1 9

OF DOUBLE EFFECT
must consider that an act of
or medical mutilation is one
is intended to effect a good (to
bodily integrity), although
is foreseen that the same act will
in an evil consequence (the
IIWUICbo,n· or excision of body tissue
. excision of some organ). Such an
termed a voluntary in cause, or
Indirectly voluntary act. On this
tells us:
.
a difference between the
which the act itself is
and the . way in which its
QeQutences are voluntary. That is
in itself, or directly
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voluntary, which is the thing willed,
whether it be willed as an end or as
means to an end. That is voluntary
in cause, or indirectly voluntary,
which is the unintended but
foreseen consequence of something
else that is voluntary in itself; the
agent does not will it either as end
or as means ... he wills the cause
of which this ~s a necessary
effect. 20
The indirectly voluntary act of
twofold effect act brings into our
account of moral principles applicable
to the morality of tissue and organ
transplantation which requires
mutilation of the recipient and the
donor as necessary surgical procedure,
the principle of double effect. It is
obvious that with the directly
voluntary act, evil becomes the direct
object of the will-act as either end or
means. Of necessity such an act is not
morally permitted, for one is never
permitted to directly will an evil; i.e.,
one · may not morally choose to rob a
bank. In an indirectly voluntary act,
however, one does not will the evil
effect which is brought into causal
existence together with the good
effect which is intended but rather,
the evil effect is foreseen as probable
consequence of the direct action. Thus
we may speak of an indirect
mutilation (one which is indirectly
voluntary) as one in which there is
lessening of bodily integrity as a
natural . effect of the act, but the intention of the agent is directed toward
the conservation of the total natural
good, or the good of the whole body.
As it were , the mutilation follows
indirectly from the will-act, but there
is a sufficient proportionality which
exists between the indirect consequent
effect and the directly intended or
willed effect. In the two-fold effect act
there are two effects which flow from
the one and the same cause as follows:

a
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(To save life
or bodily
integrity.)

L-------l

(Suppression
· of organic
function or
excision of
a member of
the body.)

In order that one might engage in an
act which has two effects, one good
and one evil, the four conditions of
the "principle of double effect" must
be met. It is not sufficient that merely
one or two or three conditions be met,
but rather ·the act must be in
conformity with each of the
following:

1. The act itself which brings about
both a good effect and evil effect must
be good or at least morally indifferent.
The act of excision (or incision) in se
is morally indifferent in its generic
nature but becomes good when
directed to some specific intention of
the will as in . the excision of a
malignant tumor, etc.
2. The good effect must not be
obtained by means of the evil effect in
such a way that the good flows from
the evil as follows:
H.A. - - - E.E.--- G.E.
The importance of priority of good
effect is not one of time but rather
one of causality . .The evil effect may
neither be means or agency of the
good effect. One may not engage in
evil that good may come of it - the
end does not justify the means. One
must be careful to note that the
suppression of organic function or use
of a member does not itself bring
about the good which is intended;

rather, it is the .ridding of t h body of
the pathologic condition t h
good health to be restored m
saved.
3. The evil effect must in
intended but merely toi
casually connected with th
good effect. If the evil effc ·
enter one's intention in an) :ay, even
partially, the agent make this evil
effect a directly voluntld· · act by
willing it as end or mean The evil
effect must simply be t . r; rated as
unavoidable and as concan tant with
the good effect. As Aquina .ells us:
"Nothing hinders om
having two effects, <-"
which is intended, wh
·is beside the intention."
4. There must exist ~~
proportion between the g.
effects whereby one deci.
necessity of placing the t
act. If we had no pn

reasonable
· .d and evil
~ upon the

fold effect
·~Htionately

grave reason for 'allowinf.! · ,1e foreseen
evil effect, then certain. we would
not be morally permit;
such needless injury to o. s person. If
the evil effect is grave , t !, .1 the reason
for placing the a-. must be
proportionately grave. If · d e evil eff~ct
be slight then the reasc · for pla~mg
the act may be proporti tlately slight
or greater. Also, if it ~,. possible to
substitute a similar actic• \ which has a
lesser evil or perhaps ,10 evil effect
whatsoever, then one 1i!USt seriously
weigh the necessity of tJ··- intended act
as opposed to the equivalent act ~r
actions. One. may speak of this
condition as the principle of

reasonable or due proportionality·
VARIOUS TYPES
OF TISSUE TRANSPLANTS
From what has been said thus far~

c~n be seen that mutilation maY
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generic medical or
procedure which results in two
species of surgery directed
the removal of a threatening
or pathologic organ, or toward
removal of healthy tissue or
thy organ of the body. Certainly
removal of a pathologic organ or
llrelilteJnin:g mass which constitutes ·a
to bodily integrity can be seen
posing no moral difficulties under
principle oftotality.
exCision of
tissue or organ, the moral
is not so easily answered.
we attempt to discuss the
implications of organ
tation, let us consider briefly
implications ofexcision of healthy
nonpathologic tissue. Tissue
tation covers a broad variety
transference oforganic living matter
from tissue itself, as in corneal
tatjon, skin grafting, etc., to
derivatives, as in the case of the
ones. The procedure of
tation itself may involve: a)
aui'mn~an, where tissue is taken
one's own body; b) a homograft,
involves ·a "tissue donation"
another man; c) a heterograft,
utilizes tissue or tissue
IIV~ttiV4~s from different species. 2 2
transplantation of tissue taken
one's own body (autograft)
no moral problem since the
is in keeping with the
of totality - a mutilation of
in order to secure the well-being
entire body. Generally speaking,
(animal to man) is
peJrm.itssible. 2 3 In the case of a
(man to man) a distinction
· made between a graft or
taken from one who - is
as opposed to one who is dead.
is no moral problem presented
tt10:mo1naft from the dead, such as

· transplants from the recent dead or
tissue obtained from "bank"
resources. However, homograft from
the living admits of moral qualification
as follows:
If the mutilation does not destroy
the functional integrity of the
donor, it is morally permissible
according to good opinion.
Examples are blood donation and
kidney transplantation. If the
mutilation destroys the functional
integrity of the donor, it is
immoral. An example would be the
donation of both corneas. 2 4
It is obvious that our- present
discussion is concerned with the
homograft from a living person
together with its consequent
implications.

THE LICEITY
OF TRANSPLANTATION
Following an analysis of the
"obligation of charity and the order of
charity in man's duties to his neighbor,
especially the recognized liceity of
sacrificing one's life for the sake of the
neighbor's temporal welfare," Father
Cunningham draws the following
conclusion as a "sufficiently probable
opinion": "Per se operations which

involve the transplantation of organs
or of sections thereof are. licit; they
involve no opposition to the natural or
supernatural moral law ." 2 5 He is
quick to speak of possible exceptions
to this principle and allows for the
same in two specific instances:
First of all, if a person's being a
donor · for an isoplasty would
certainly or very probably cause his
own death, then it would not be
licit for him to allow · such a
mutilation ... it does not seem
consonant with traditional moral
teaching to admit the liceity of his
submission to a mutilation which
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would certainly or even very
probably cause his own
death. . .. The second exception to
this: if the result of such an
operation would be sterility for the
donor, then it would be illicit to
permit or perform such a
rimtilation? 6
"The bases of Father Cunningham's
opinion are: (a) the unity of men in
specifically the same human nature;
(b) the unity of men in the Mystical
Body of Christ; (c) the resultant
mutual relationships between men
which involve their bodies and bodily
members; (d) the observance of the
precept of charity to one's neighbor in
need." 2 7
Father Cunningham's mention of
the first instance of exception would
seem to substantiate the principle
basic to all mutilation which does not
allow for any procedure, medical or
surgical, which would directly cause
· the death of the individual. "A direct
mutilation which would very likely
cause a man's death would be direct
cause of that death." 2 8 Exposure of
oneself to such danger would be
tantamount to suicide. Hence, "if
there is true and solid probability of
his dying as a result of the mutilation,
then we cannot admit the liceity of
that operation . no matter what good
might accrue to the neighbor as a
result of it." 2 9·
Mutilation is licit only when the
organic or functional integrity of the
body or its members is not
permanently impaired or destroyed ·so
as to jeopardize the health or life of
the corporeal totality. However, in
virtue of the body's ability to repair
itself and the compensatory nature of
the twin organs it possesses when one
such twin is diseased ·or removed, the
principle would allow for the removal
of tissue which can be replaced by the
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ordinary process of nat t' .tl or
extrinsically induced body re. 1ir, as
well as the removal of tissth or an
organ which can be ad; uately
substituted for by the latent
potentiality of homologous 1 · 'me or
organ present in the body . .
The moralist makes the di. :nction
between the substan t f.
and
nonsubstantial integrity of tl body.
From the foregoing we can .:e that
submission to or performa .~ of a
medical or surgical procedu which
would result in a substantic• loss of
bodily integrity would l. illicit.
However, if we employ the inciples
of reasonable proportiona :Y and
fraternal charity we find th loss of
non substantial integrity is ~ .aetimes
permissible. Donation of a si; le organ
such as a heart or liver woui result in
a complete suppression c organic
function in the corporeal . iality of
the donor. Such a donat1. .i would
result in a loss of sub stan ~ 1 bodily
integrity and hence is illicit . iowever,
in the case of double orga ~ . such as
the kidneys, ovar i e ~ lungs,
mechanisms of the eye and ,· rr, etc., it
has been shown that the 1.; , · of one
organ may result in loss of
nonsubstantial integrity onl ~
Theologians and man<.sts have
traditionally permitted e.x, •osure of
one's life to risk for the sa'.i~ of one's
neighbor. Fr. Cunningham ;·.~ els that it
is within the bounds of th ,' principle
of fraternal charity that 0 11'' may make
the smaller sacrifice of dorn tion of an
organ to his fellowman in need. There
is substantial agreement an.ong those
concerned with . the morality of
organic transplantation that "minor
mutilations" of bodily integrity are
licit when there is present some
proportionate reason for permitting
them. "Certainly, the assistance of the
neighbor who is in need . .. does
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a sufficiently just cause for the
ssion of such injuries to
... And 'when the skin-graft
the blood-transfusion is not
for the donor, then they
teem to be perfectly licit minor
mutila!ions, permitted for the purpose
of charity. " 3 0 And even cases of
"experimentation involving minor or
accidental mutilation or suppression of
• organic function is not a violation
Of man's guardianship of his life and
integrity, and therefore is
rally permissible for good
i)&WIORIIIli'll.

,31

:_~lipitals''

of the "Ethical and
Directives for Catholic
states:

Any procedure harmful to the
patient is morally justified only
insofar as it is .designed to produce
a proportionate good.
Or din ~ri ly . the "proportionate
sood" that justifies a directly
mutilating proc~dure must be the
welfare of the patient himself.
However, such things as blood
transfusions and skin grafts are
permitted for the good of others~
Whether this principle of "helping
the neighbor" can justify organic
transplantation is now a matter· of
discussion.
is seemingly beyond controversy
minor mutilations are justifiable
the principle of fraternal
However, whether a donor
to a major mutilation as in
transplant which is not necessary
the good of the health of the body
rather for the good of one's
bor does · present a moral

-

~-~-----

Furthermore, · Christian doctrine
establishes, and the light of human
reason makes it most clear, that
private individuals have no power
over the members of their bodies
than that which pertains to their
natural ends; and they are not free
to destroy or mutilate their
members, or in any other . way
render themselves unfit for their
natural functions, except when no
other provision can be made for the
good ofthe whole body. 32
The Pontifs statement would seem to
make no allowance for the use of
one's body in any manner whatsoever
except for the sustaining of an
individual's bodily integrity alone.
~owever, it has been suggested by
Father Gerald Kelly that the Pope was
not treating of mutilation as such but
rather of the rights which the state and
the individual have in relation to
sterilization. 3 3 Pius XI declared that
the state has no power whatsoever
over the members of innocent ·citizens
and added that the individual had only
limited powers in this regard. In but a
brief paragraph he incorporated the
existing theology on the subject of
self-mutilation. Fr. Kelly persues this
line of reasoning by stating that the
theologians of that time "commonly
recognized only one natural-. purpose
of organs, namely, to serve the person
who possesses them." 34
But suppose that theologians today,
after having carefully considered the
facts concerning organic
transplantation, would conclude that,
since an organ or section thereof can
function vitally in another body, this
may also be called a natural (though
secondary) purpose of such organs or
sections .... If such an extended
meaning is permissible, Father
Cunningham's thesis can be
harmonized with the encyclical; for if
only a section of an organ, or only one
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of a pair of'organs, is transplanted, this
transplanted part fulftlls a secondary
natural purpose (helping the neighbor)
without defeating the primary purpose
(the good of one's own body). 35
Father Charles Curran in an
interesting dialogue between himself as
theologian and Dr. Robert White,
director of Brain Research
Laboratories at. ClevelaNd
Metropolitan General Hospital,
discussed the principle of fraternal
charity as follows: ·
The general principle would be that
one has administrative power over
one's own body, and provided he
does not appreciably _maim himself
or open himself up to the risk of
grave personal injury, he can give
what he has to help someone
else. 3 6
DEFINITION OF DEATH AND
MORAL SPECULATION

Among the many issues of a moral ,
medical, legal and social nature which
are engendered by transplant surgery,
the most crucial of these would seem
to be the determination of the criteria
of the moment of death of the donor.
Recent advances in chemical and
electronic cardiac resuscitation ·
techniques, as well as the use of
mechanical respirators, have created a
need for redefining the concept of ·
death. No longer is the heretofore
standard definition - the complete
and permanent cessation of respix:ation
and circulation - adequate as totally
descriptive of .medical death. The
electroencephalogram (E.E.G.) is
currently used in helping to establish
"death," but its findings do not always
afford a conclusive indication of actual
brain damage. It has been found that a
barbituate overdose may result in a
flat E.E.G. for four hours or more. "A .
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report of the Royal Acadt
Medicine in London reve<'
among a group of 102 he a'
victims who were still un >
more than one month after ir:
fewer than 63 survived and 48
eventually went back to their
or to less demanding l'
productive work." 3 7

1y of
that
injury
ncious
ry, no
f them
rd jobs
still

Taking into account that · L~ brain
is not capable of a i ficial
resuscitation, as are the h' -rt and
lungs, · Dr. William Like , past
president of the American ( Hege of
Cardiology suggests that: " . · Jth can
be defined as coming wl- .1 brain
function has ceased anteced. t tO ·the
death of cardiac function ."
Added
to the traditional criteria t · medical
death is the cessation of 1 :ll brain
function. It would seem tha. :he total
"criteria of death" would ( •,: ompass
complete and permanent ct :1tion of
heart, lung and brain fun ct · ·1S. "But
more and more doctors now . ·gue that
life ends when the brain p t: -1anently
ceases to function - eve n : , Jugh the
heartbeat and respiration may be
. d . by artl'fitcta
. 1 resp·- ·a t ors. " 39
sustame
Is it possible that medical :~ ath is to
be determined on the ba ·:; of the
complete cessation of funct <m of one
organ alone? That this may '-·. ell be the
case is evidenced as follows:

tion. Granted that such
is possible in our age of
and technological advance,
are innumerable moral, legal and
al questions which can be
only in the light of a
'lll11tfini1tive medical statement on death.
is not only the responsibility, but
prerogative of the men of medical
SCience to formulate such a definition.
1Rlbvev1er, the definition must be fixed
than argumentative; for unless
know precisely of medical death,
issues of a moral nature cannot
41
.
resolved.
For example, let us
a statement by Fr. John
ynch in relation to heart
tation:
no circumstances, even if the
~o,.aJro!:nPi''ti've
donor is certainly
r¥1 ~JUn:tea to die within a very short
may the doctor anticipate
and begin removing the heart
a living 'human subject. This
ement derives from a
tr1Deolof!ical view of man's dominion
life ... that depends
on an essential distinction between
the moral obligation not to kill and
the moral obligation to keep alive.
Only the former is absolute. In
lec~rdance with it, direct killing of
mnocent human being, even if
otherwise already doomed to die,
remains murder. 4 2

Cooley (Dr. Denton A.) : te d that
in each of three heart trr, 1splants he
has done' the heart w e,:; 'faintly
quivering' - although nc : beating40
at the time it was removcd.

stated that "the doctor may not
death." But unless we know
. what is meant by death, we
proceed no further.

The acceptance of "brain death" as
the sole criterion is not outside of the
realm of the possible. How~'ver, at the
present time it can in no way be
medically accepted as so until such
time as the apparati for determining
cessation of brain function are brought
to a new level of sensitivity and

is true that a man does not have
dominion over his life; but what
precisely over which he has no
dominion, his life of brain, of
or of lungs, or all three? The
of fraternal charity would
allow a dominion over at least
a set of paired organs of the
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body in the inter~st of the physical
well-being of one's neighbor. May not
the principle be extended to the heart,
lungs, pancreas, etc. , which could no
longer serve the function for which
they were given to this man by the
Creator since inevitable "total death"
is imminent in virtue of brain death?
It is obvious that transplantation of
non-paired organs under the present
definition of death is nothing other
than homicide, pure and simple. Even
the principle of fraternal charity could
not be employed if the definition
remains confused, for , "just as killing
out of mercy to the patient would
always be wrong, so too, killing to
obtain a transplant (mercy to another)
would always be wr,ong." 4 3 This is so,
for in either case , there is the direct
killing of an innocent human being
(murder) for some particular end
disguised under the cloak of "mercy to
one's neighbor;" a euphemistic ·action
which can in no way be morally
justified. "Whatever, then, may be the
.acceptable indications of medical
death, these must be verified before
one could allow the removal of an
organ so essential to life that its
excision would amount to a direct
killing. " 4 4

But let us for a moment embark on
a bold venture and discuss the
possibility of ·medical death as being
determined by the criterion of "brain
death" alone. It may become a reality
that the E.E.G. and other related
instruments will be made so sensitive
that they can give an unquestionable
reading of actual brain death. When
the condition of the brain has indeed
reached a point of no return in the
sense that there is an absolute
cessation of brain function beyond the
ability of the . organ or body to
reconstitute the same , according to
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current tendencies the heretofore
traditional criteria of death would not
constitute an essential part of th~
definition of medical death. 4 5

If the medical world were to decide
that medical death is simply brain
death, there would be no medical or
legal problem of heart, lung, kidney or
other paired or non-paired transplant
surgery. It would be unnecessary to
discuss the moral aspects of organ
donation since there would be no
moral problem. The .o nly exception to
the moral permissibility of organ
donation under the "brain criterion of
death" would be the donation of the
brain itself; and this would in itself
present no problem, since the brain
cannot be used if indeed it is dead.
Again, if medical certitude were
made possible by a new sophistication
of instruments whereby brain death
could accurately be qetermined; and if
the findings of such technology were
used as the sole criterion of death, one
can easily envision the haste with
which transplant surgery of varied
types would come about. Perhaps the
· prospect of an ample supply of body
organs and parts which would be
precipitated by the acceptance of such
a unique standard would cause some
to readily accept a norm based on the
brain criterion above. And of course in
the mind of the layman there would
remain the question of whether one is
being in fact murdered when a vital
organ is removed from one who is
"medically dead" (brain dead) but
whose heart and lungs continue to
function either naturally or artificially.
This q1,1estion I would suspect will
cause the medical · community to use
the criteria of total or absolute
cessation of the vital functions of at
least the brain and heart taken
together .4 6 If this does not occur,
then a new definition of life must be
determined.
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And if life is simply define1 as "the
JbOernea, but until that occurs, one
continued vital functioning of the
. ·apply what knowledge of moral
brain ," then removal of a via1 ~ heart,
he has to the present
lung, pancreas, etc., after br '1 death
llttll!lticm . In summation let us look to
has been accurately establish· ~ would
moral principles discussed which
seem to be morally perrnissi! ~ - If we ......,, - ....... be applied to the resolution of
repeat the words of Fr. Lyn . L at this
moral complexities of organ
point , viz. , "whatever, then may be J'· lranspJan1tation.
the acceptable indications o medical
death, these .must be verifj, l before
one could allow the remo J of an
organ so essential to li/ ( that its
God alone has direct dominien over
exciston would amount t< a direct
the person of man; and reserved to
killing," we can see that mly the
Him alone is the power of life and
removal of the brain ib f would
death.
constitute a direct killing nder the
"one criterion" definition c death. 47
And of course removal of Jn-paired
Since · man is but steward of his
donor organs essential to or tpportive
·person, he is always morally obliged
of the life of the brain s h as the
to use ordinary means of sustaining
lungs (in their entirety) an the heart
bodily ·integrity; whereas under
would obviously be morall) irong and
certain conditions one may use
medically foolish. Hence, , heart or
extraordinary means if he so desires.
lungs or any other non-p;_ ·~ d organs
of the body could be p. -;ured for
transplantation on1y wr' ·,1 "brain
death" has been um. ' ;stionably
The justification of mutilation rests
established and occurs pri, · to "heart
in the proportionate necessity of
death."
sacrificing a part of · the body in
order to preserve the integrity of
SUMMATION
the whole when the welfare of the
One might simply say ~.·:at because
whole body cannot be secured by
of the complexity of e"'- iblishing a
any other means.
definitive statement on tl _: concept ~:
death that the "decisio: of death
should be left to the lJrofess~o~al
the case of a two-fold effect act,
discretion of the attendi:.g phystctan
r'ffJJlen:~bv
there results a good effect
in each individual ca:-:· Howeve~
i$ intended and an evil effect
practical this was prior t:. 1 the c~rren
is foreseen but unintended,
revolution in ·transplant Sil rgery, tt h~
e
conditions
of prudent
lost certain aspects of i L' validity ~
1
ua
tion
of
such
a unique
'the sense of the legai and mor t
of human act as
complications which are contingend
comsiaered above must be fulfilled.
upon the rights of both donor an
.
·
heretofore
reciptent which were
f
·
· no
of Fraternal Charity:
non-existent . Perhaps the mventto
an artificial heart or great er success
h
one's neighbor
t e
with heterografts may so1ve h e
one may morally do for
problems with which we are er
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The Roman Catholic church as yet
has not given its official teaching on
the question of organic transplantation
inter vivos, but of course the
discussions among theologians and
moralists have. greatly increased in the
past few months since the
announcement of the first human
heart transplant.
"Of those ·who have , expressed
themselves publicly on the subject, the
majority - it would seem safe to say profess to see at least solidly probable
grounds for declaring this form of
trans p 1an tation permissible under
certain circumstances." 4 8 There are
those, however, who express a strong
contradictory view and would allow
mutilation only when it is necessary
for one's own physical well-being. In
keeping with the principle of fraternal
charity ~ those who defend the licitness
of organic transplant to assist one's
neighbor proclaim one may morally do
for another what one may legitimately
do for oneself. But what is the
transplant surgeon to do in the wake
of such a variety of opinion? Fr.
Lynch would grant him that course of
action which would allow him the
"greater liberty of medical action"
when he says:
No one is required to acknowledge
as obligatory a prohibition which is
at best objectively doubtful. In
other words, no theologian could
legitimately accuse of moral wrong
doing the physician who involves
himself professionally in organic
transplantation with due regard for
those · precautions which sound
medical sense would prescribe for
that procedure. Or to put it more
precisely ... the doctor, ·who in
medical prudence seeks to preserve
human life by means of organic
transplantation, can merit no less
theologically than he does
scientifically. 4 9
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And so the dialogue continues. And so
we end our discussion.
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